

EXHIBIT NO. 8-B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB

29 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 November 1945, same file number and subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese documents relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander :

/sgd/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] Dec 1976

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-2.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

22 OCTOBER 1945.

Navy Ministry

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.

29. Copies of the following will be submitted :

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.
2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack.
3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as a result no documents are available. The essential points in the orders relative to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men :

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff.

Section Orders and Directives

Real Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's Section, Naval General Staff).

Combined Fleet Orders

Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Combined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)

Task Force Orders

Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air Unit).

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).

5 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CInC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials)

9 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during these movements.

[3] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth in the Separate Volume.

NOTE: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is recalled as follows:

"At the very beginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous areas.

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 5 is limited to the following cases:

1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japanese territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.

[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach Japanese territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).

1 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept and destroy them.

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Commander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American,

English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect them.

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be given in a later order.

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).

1 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

The Combined Fleet operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume—"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".

[5] NOTE: As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate Volume was entirely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive of 5 November.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials).

2 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.

2 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO).

It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of military power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special order to return.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN

7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet

[6]

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy in movements.

NOTE: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order (giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also issued. Detailed information as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued later).

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
22 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).

At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdrawn immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks.

B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.

NOTE: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now been corrected to 22 November.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
25 Nov. 41

[7]

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possible.

NOTE: In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order—(essentials).

Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.

Text: X-Day will be 8 December.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
23 Nov 41

NAGUMO, Chuichi
Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.

B. Chart (See next page.)

B. The allocation of strength will be shown in the table below.

UNIT		COMMAND	STRENGTH	DUTY
Air Force		CinC 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet	Air Attack
Screening Unit		Com Des Ron 1	Flag of Des Ron 1; Des Div 17 Des Div 18; AKIGUMO	Screen; cover
Task	Support Force	Com Bat Div 3	Bat Div, 3, - 2D (TN Presumably, less 2 elements.); Cru Div 8	Screen; support
Patrol Unit		Com Sub Div 2	Flag; I-19; I-21; I-23	Patrol ship lanes
Force	Midway Neutralization Unit	Com Des Div 7	Des Div 7, - 2D (TN Presumably less 2 elements.)	Attack on MIDWAY Air Base
Supply Force	1 Supply Unit	Captain of KYOKU- UTO MARU (橘栗) MARU (Special duty ship)	Captain of KYOK- UTO MARU	Supply
	2 Supply Unit		Captain of TOHO MARU	
			KENYŌ (彦洋) MARU; KYOKUTO MARU; KOKUYO (國洋) MARU; SHINKOKU (神國) AKEBONO MARU	
			TOHO MARU; TOBI (康榮) MARU; NIPPON MARU	

[8] C. Movements of each force.

1. General:

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITOKAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point (Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at every opportunity en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is designated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where contact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W).

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and important air bases on OAHU.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event, Car Div 5 and the two ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Force on the night of X-Day to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against MIDWAY.

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent back.

2. Patrol Unit:

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during landings and takeoffs.

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy; if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available strength.

3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.

[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point where the enemy will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.

D. In the event that the operation is cancelled while the Task Force is under way, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or MUTSU-KAIWAN.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN

23 Nov 41

Nagumo, CHUICHI

Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows:

A. Movements of Air Attack Force.

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course.

At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z.

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 0645 hours and 0715 hours.

When the units return preparations will be made immediately for the next attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed against it.

B. Organization of air attack units.

As shown in Separate Tables.

C. Targets.

1. First attack unit.

[10] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN)

(1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.

(2) Order of selection.

First battleships, then carriers.

B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below

(1) 15 Attack Unit

FORD Island—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(2) 16 Attack Unit

WHEELER Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(3) Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated below.

(1) 5 Attack Unit

KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT—hangars and Grounded planes.

(2) 6 Attack Unit

HICKHAM Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be attacked in that order.

c. Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

D. Outline of attack procedure.

1. First Attack Unit.

2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit will attack first; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last.

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.

(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units

Ford and HICKHAM

(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units

WHEELER and BARBERS POINT

(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units

KANEOHE

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time interval between attacks.

(1) Fighter Striking Unit

(2) Ship Bombing Unit

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit

2. Second Attack Unit.

The entire unit will attack at about the same time.

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is

encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows: 2. 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units.

- FORD AND HICKAM
b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.

WHEELER and KANEOHE

[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its use of torpedo planes.

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fleet and then OAHU, maintaining its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fighter Striking units.

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.

4. Regrouping and returning:

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude the rendezvous will be made below them).

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to their ships.

c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack units and intercept any enemy pursuit.

E. Reconnaissance:

1. Reconnaissance before the attack.

No special reconnaissance will be made.

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at these anchorages.

3. Scouting and search.

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible, between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-attacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.

4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes (will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) will conduct a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and airplanes.

F. Air Patrol:

From 1 hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of attack, Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.

SEPARATE SAKLS

UNIT		COMMANDER		TYPE of AIRPLANE	NUMBER of AIRPLANES	TYPE of ATTACK	ARMAMENT (each plane)				
FIRST ATTACK	1 Group (SHUDAN)	1 Attack Unit	Comdr.	Comdr. FUCHIDA	TYPE 97	Horizontal	One No 80,				
		2 Attack Unit		Lt. Comdr. HASHIGUCHI			15	bombing	Mark 5		
		3 Attack Unit		Lt. ANO			10	attack	Bomb		
		4 Attack Unit		Lt. Comdr. KUSUMI			10				
	2 GROUP	1 Special Attack Unit	FU-	Lt. Comdr. MURASA	Carrier	12	Torpedo	One Type-			
		Attack Unit		Lt. KITAJIMA				BOMBING	31 Aerial		
		2 Special		Lt. NAGAI					12	Attack	Torpedo
		3 Special Attack Unit		Lt. MATSUMURA					8		
	4 Special Attack Unit		8								
	UNIT	3 Group	15 Attack Unit	FU-	Lt. Comdr. TAKAHASHI	Type 99	27	Dive Bombing	One No. 25		
			16 Attack Unit		Lt. SAKAMOTO	Carrier Bomber		27	Attack	Land Bomb	
		Three (3) Group	1 Fighter Striking Unit	OEDA	Lt. Comdr. IWAYA	Type	9	Air Control			
2 Fighter S.U.			Lt. SHIGA		9				and		
3 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. SUZUKAWA		9						
4 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. OKAWA		6				Strafing		
5 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. SANO		6				Attack		
6 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. KANEKO		6						
SECOND ATTACK		1 Group	6 Attack Unit	Lt.	Lt. Comdr. SUZUKAWA	Type 97	27	Horizontal Bombing	One No 25, land bomb, Six No 6, Ordinary Bomb.		
			5 Attack Unit		Lt. OHNARA	Attack plane				27	Attack
		2 Group	13 Attack Unit	Comdr.	Lt. Comdr. NISHI	Type 99	18	Dive	One No 25,		
			14 Attack Unit		Lt. KUBAYASHI	Carrier Bomber				18	Bombing
	11 Attack Unit		Lt. OHNARA		27	18				Attack	Bomb
	12 Attack Unit		Lt. MAEDA								
3 Group	8 Fighter Striking Unit	SAKI	Lt. SHIMIZU	Type	9	Air control					
	2 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. MIKAI	Carrier			9	and			
	3 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. IJIMA	Carrier			9	Strafing			
	4 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. NISHI	Fighter			9	Attack			